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Valentina Vadi*
Spatio-Temporal Dimensions of Indigenous Sovereignty
in International Law
The sovereignty of indigenous peoples has long been a matter of debate. This 
chapter investigates the spatio-temporal dimensions of indigenous sovereignty in 
international law. The topic holds both theoretical relevance and contemporary 
practical significance, as it can inform and transform ongoing debates on the 
rights of indigenous peoples. The author highlights the importance of history 
in any serious and constructive consideration of the territorial and spatial 
dimensions of sovereignty. It also highlights that a just or at least fair resolution 
of any question relating to sovereignty, including its territorial dimension, must 
fully consider competing stories, histories, and temporalities of sovereignty. This 
method of analysis infuses the concept of sovereignty with inter-civilisational 
connotations, which are often neglected in current debates. Going beyond the 
traditional conception of state sovereignty, the chapter supports the emergence 
of novel concepts, such as parallel sovereignty, to complement and give further 
impulse to the self-determination of indigenous peoples within the state. This 
reflection appeals to the experiences and histories of non-Western cultures and 
civilisations, thereby opening new avenues for informing future theory and 
practice of international law.
1. Introduction 
The sovereignty of indigenous peoples has long been a matter of 
debate. Indigenous peoples are situated between the national and the 
international arenas. They belong to given states and yet, at the same 
time, they constitute nations with inherent rights under international law.1 
1 K. Göcke, Indigene Landrechte im internationalen Vergleich (Springer 2016).
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Although the recognition of indigenous peoples’ inherent rights has gained 
some momentum at the international law level since the adoption of the 
2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP),2 law and policy have often failed to respect, protect, and 
fulfil indigenous entitlements. For instance, many of the estimated 370 
million indigenous people around the world have lost or risk losing their 
ancestral lands because of the exploitation of natural resources.3 Therefore, 
investigating the concept of sovereignty in relation to indigenous peoples 
not only holds theoretical relevance, but also contemporary practical 
significance, as it can inform and transform ongoing debates on the rights 
of indigenous people. 
This chapter investigates the concept of indigenous sovereignty in 
international law not only ‘for the purpose of revealing and remedying the 
past’ but for contributing to the development of international law.4 For 
indigenous peoples, indigenous sovereignty (i.e., the supreme power over 
their polity and autonomy) has never yielded or terminated; rather, it has 
a perpetual temporal dimension. Their traditional notions of indigenous 
sovereignty also include a key spatial dimension that transcends the 
drawing of boundaries and notions of property. For indigenous peoples, 
their sovereignty expresses the spiritual tie between the land and indigenous 
communities. At the same time, they acknowledge that indigenous 
sovereignty has in part co-existed with, and is parallel to, the sovereignty of 
the state. Most indigenous peoples do not aim to secede from the states in 
which they reside; rather, they seek to exert greater control over natural and 
cultural resources, and to obtain greater autonomy in order to safeguard 
their cultural legacy and determine their own future. The aim of this chapter 
is to investigate whether a notion of parallel sovereignty of indigenous 
peoples can be conceptualised, and whether sovereignty can be shared 
2 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) G.A. Res. 
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). The Declaration was approved 
by 143 nations, but was opposed by the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia. However, these four nations subsequently endorsed the Declaration. Drafted 
with the very active participation of indigenous representatives, the Declaration consti-
tutes the outcome of two decades of preparatory work. While this landmark instrument 
is currently not binding, this may change in the future to the extent that its provisions 
reflect customary international law. UNDRIP, preamble.
3 V. Vadi, ‘Heritage, Power and Destiny: The Protection of Indigenous Heritage in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration’ (2018) 50 George Washington International 
Law Review 101–155.
4 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
CUP 2005) 199.
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between states and indigenous peoples.5 
This chapter examines the question of indigenous sovereignty in 
international law by focusing on three distinct dimensions: 1) time; 2) space; 
and 3) law. First, it highlights the importance of history and the temporal 
dimension for any serious and constructive consideration of sovereignty. 
The chapter explores the theoretical basis that supports notions of parallel 
indigenous sovereignty in municipal and international law. It further affirms 
that a just or at least fair resolution of any question relating to sovereignty, 
including its territorial dimension, must fully consider competing stories, 
histories, and temporalities of sovereignty. Second, the chapter investigates 
the notion of space in relation to indigenous peoples’ rights and sovereignty, 
holding that there is ‘some promise … in a practice of sovereignty that 
operates in spite of lines on a map.’6 Third, the chapter suggests the 
adoption of a novel approach to analysing sovereignty in international law, 
developing the concept of parallel sovereignty and infusing the concept with 
inter-civilisational connotations and meanings, which often remain invisible 
in current debates.7 
The chapter proceeds as follows. After briefly examining the notion 
of sovereignty, it discusses the spatio-temporal features of indigenous 
sovereignty and briefly illuminates the legal issue raised by the historical 
encounter of civilisations. It then explores the emergence of novel concepts 
such as parallel or shared sovereignty as useful conceptual tools that can 
contribute to the respect, protection, and fulfilment of indigenous peoples’ 
rights. In this way, such notions can contribute to dismantling colonial 
relics,8 appealing to experiences and histories of non-Western cultures 
and civilisations and thereby opening new avenues for informing future 
5 M. Nino, Land grabbing e sovranità territoriale in diritto internazionale (Napoli: 
Editoriale Scientifica 2018) 203.
6 M. Fakhri, ‘Third World Sovereignty, Indigenous Sovereignty, and Food Sovereignty: 
Living with Sovereignty despite the Map’ (2018) 9 Transnational Legal Theory 218–253, 
218.
7 But see Y. Onuma, International Law in a Transcivilizational World (Cambridge: CUP 
2017).
8 See W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) 362 (calling the assumption that domes-
tic law consists of the state law and that public international law consists of the law of 
sovereign states as the ‘Westphalian duo’); R. Dibadj, ‘Panglossian Transnationalism’ 
(2008) 44 Stanford Journal of International Law 253, 256 (noting that as ‘a product of 
the Westphalian state-centered system of world law’, international law ‘maintains that the 
states are the only subjects of international law…’).
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theory and practice of international law.9 Although several countries have 
adopted notions of concurrent or parallel sovereignty which recognise the 
sovereignty of indigenous peoples within their lands, international law 
instruments refrain from openly discussing the question of indigenous 
sovereignty. However, this chapter argues that the use of concepts such 
as shared or parallel sovereignty would be sound in theory and viable in 
practice. Recognising indigenous sovereignty as a special form of sovereignty 
that is parallel to and coexists with state sovereignty is not only a way to 
implement indigenous peoples’ rights at the domestic level, but also a way 
to strengthen the role indigenous people play in international affairs by 
reframing the relationship between state and non-state actors in ways which 
privilege human rights over the reason of state.10 
2. Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty indicates supreme power and has both 
internal and external dimensions. Internal sovereignty refers to the supreme 
power over a given polity, autonomy, and exclusive competence over its 
internal affairs. External sovereignty refers to the capacity of a polity to act in 
international relations, its right to exercise self-defense, and to ratify treaties. 
The notion of sovereignty implies the equality of nations.11 
Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, sovereignty has been traditionally 
associated with the notion of state meant as a political entity with its own 
people, territory, and government.12 As Crawford put it, sovereignty has 
been conceptualised as a package of rights and obligations that accompanies 
9 K. Anker, Declarations of Interdependence: A Legal Pluralist Approach to Indigenous Rights 
(Milton: Ashgate 2014)(advancing legal pluralist approaches to indigenous rights and 
relying, inter alia, on Indigenous legal traditions).
10 H. Nicol, ‘From Territory to Rights: New Foundations for Conceptualising Indigenous 
Sovereignty’ (2017) 22 Geopolitics 794–814.
11 Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 
April 1949, [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 177–8 (defining states as ‘political entities equal in law, 
similar in form …, the direct subjects of international law.’); John H. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-
Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept (2003) 97 AJIL 782–802.
12 A. Pagden Lords of all the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 
1500–c.1800 (New Haven/London: Yale University Press 1995) 15; R. H. Lesaffer, ‘The 
Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and Continuity in the History of International 
Law’ (2003) 73 British Yearbook of International Law 116.
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statehood.13 The European concept of sovereignty presupposes statehood.14 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, ‘the traditional universal powers, the 
Pope and the Emperor, had lost the struggle for the establishment of their 
supremacy in Europe.’15 Therefore, a number of European states acquired 
external sovereignty (supremitas),16 no longer recognising ‘a higher external 
authority’ (superiorem non recognoscens). No longer were states merely parts 
of a greater political entity; rather, they were perfect communities, complete 
in and of themselves (communitates perfectae). Sovereignty increasingly 
overlapped with statehood, sovereign states became the primary subjects of 
the international community. 
However, the concept of nation (indicating ties of ‘belonging, language, 
religion, shared cultural as well as civilizational traditions’) as the holder 
of sovereignty ‘antedates the advent of the idea of state.’17 In Africa, 
the Americas, and Asia different concepts of sovereignty existed. In 
these continents, countries developed ‘their own ways of articulating … 
concern about the nature and scope of sovereign power’18 and sovereignty 
was layered.19 Immense native empires ruled diverse peoples in Africa, 
the Americas, and Asia.20 In Africa several imperial states including the 
Songhay Empire exerted control over large areas. In Asia, the Ottoman, 
Safavid, and Mughal empires as well as the Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368–
1644) and Japanese Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1868) exercised power 
differently but all controlled large territories and different peoples. For 
instance, international relations among Asian countries reflected China’s 
predominant status in the region.21 In the extreme North, Russian tsars 
governed an immense empire. 
The fact that European states and Indigenous nations signed treaties 
13 J. Crawford, ‘Sovereignty as a Legal Value’, in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: CUP 2012) 117–133.
14 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, in force 26 December 1934, 
165 LNTS 19.
15 Lesaffer, ‘The Grotian Tradition Revisited’, 115.
16 L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-
1900 (Cambridge: CUP 2010) 5.
17 U. Baxi, ‘India–Europe’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law (Oxford: OUP 2012) 744, 745.
18 Id. 747.
19 Z. Leonard, ‘Law of Nations Theory and the Native Sovereignty Debates in Colonial 
India’, (2019 Law and History Review 1–35, 2.
20 C. H. Parker, Global Interactions in the Early Modern Age (Cambridge: CUP 2010) 2. 
21 K. Akashi, ‘Japan–Europe’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law (Oxford: OUP 2012) 724, 726.
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suggests that native powers exercised both internal and external sovereignty.22 
It also suggests an implicit ‘acknowledgment of their equal juridical existence 
and status.’23 Indigenous nations had their own forms of governance and 
social and cultural systems. As sovereign nations, they had ‘a natural right 
of resistance’ and self-defense. 
The history of the seizure of the African, Australian, and American 
continents can be read as ‘a complex and multifaceted story of the 
de-legitimation of pre-colonial political powers over territory and people.’24 
In encountering different perceptions of governance, the European concept 
of territorial sovereignty as statehood prevailed.25 
International lawyers may well wonder whether the historical early 
modern features of the concept of sovereignty as distinct from statehood 
have any relevance today. Contemporary international law remains state-
centric. Nonetheless, the fact that the concept of sovereignty has historically 
included polities that were not states demonstrates that, at least theoretically, 
there is no necessary coincidence between sovereignty and statehood and that 
other conceptualizations of sovereignty in addition to and complementary 
to that of state sovereignty are not only possible, but used to be a part of the 
fabric of the early modern law of nations. 
Proposals to recognise and reconcile indigenous and settler sovereignties 
have increasingly been made.26 For instance, Jeremy Webber examines 
different notions of sovereignty, demonstrating that while sovereignty is 
often conceived as a unified and monolithic concept in international legal 
theory, it can instead be understood as complex, multifaceted, and multi-
layered.27 For others, indigenous sovereignty should be a fundamental 
element of reconciliation between settler and indigenous societies.28 
22 Leonard, ‘Law of Nations Theory and the Native Sovereignty Debates in Colonial India’, 4.
23 Baxi, ‘India–Europe’, 745.
24 D.-E. Kahn, ‘Territory and Boundaries’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: OUP 2012) 225–235 
(referring to the African continent). 
25 Id. 236.
26 See P. Macklem and D. Sanderson (eds), From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on 
the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press 2016). 
27 J. Webber, ‘We Are Still in the Age of Encounter: Section 35 and a Canada beyond 
Sovereignty’ in P. Macklem and D. Sanderson (eds), From Recognition to Reconciliation: 
Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 2016) 63–99.
28 S. Rigney, ‘The Hopes and Discontents of Indigenous–Settler Reconciliation’ (2017) 
11 International Journal of Transitional Justice 359–68, 365. 
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3. Space
Indigenous communities are geographically rooted in given places, but 
politically, historically, and legally situated between the national and the 
international spheres. Indigenous peoples are geographically ‘indigenous’ 
because they have been living in a given territory since time immemorial, 
even before the establishment of the state under whose sovereignty they live 
today.29 Their roots ‘are embedded in the lands on which they live … much 
more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the 
same lands.’30 They are ‘culturally distinctive societies that find themselves 
engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest.’31 
They ‘have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their 
colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus 
preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in 
accordance with their own needs and interests.’32 They hold ‘inherent rights 
which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from 
their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their 
rights to their lands, territories and resources.’33
For indigenous peoples, land is the basis of economic livelihood 
and the source of spiritual and cultural identity.34 Indigenous peoples 
maintain cultural and spiritual ties with the territory they have traditionally 
occupied35 due to the presence of sacred sites and the intrinsic sacred value 
29 Article 1 of the ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries defines indigenous peoples’ ‘on account of their descent from the 
populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country 
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions.’ 





34 J. Gilbert ‘Custodians of the Land- Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Cultural 
Integrity’ in M. Langfield, W. Logan and M. Nic Craith (eds), Cultural Diversity, 
Heritage and Human Rights (Oxon: Routledge 2010) 31.
35 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 
31 August 2001, IACtHR Series C, No. 79, 75, para. 149 (clarifying that ‘For indigenous 
communities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production 
but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their 
cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.’)
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of the territory itself.36 They ‘see the land and the sea, all of the sites they 
contain, and the knowledge and the laws associated with those sites, as a 
single entity that must be protected as a whole.’37 Although indigenous 
cultures vary across continents, ‘there is a common thread that runs through 
these diverse indigenous groups—a deep cultural and spiritual connection 
to the land, and a belief that the world is interconnected. Native peoples 
traditionally strive to live sustainably with the land, as stewards of it.’38 Land 
rights transcend drawn boundaries and notions of property. 
Although indigenous peoples are politically situated between the 
national and the international arenas, for decades, indigenous peoples have 
been considered solely as components of states, rather than ‘legal unit[s] 
of international law.’39 As a result, indigenous peoples have been perceived 
and treated solely as subjects of domestic law.40 As Daes contended, for 
centuries international law seemed to know no other subjects than states.41 
By denying the sovereignty of indigenous peoples, or failing to implement 
their obligations toward them under the law of nations, states have infringed 
indigenous peoples’ rights.42 
Nonetheless, in the past decades there have been attempts to listen to 
indigenous voices and to appreciate their methodologies and knowledge 
systems. An understanding has arisen that a given territory can be ‘home to 
multiple sovereignties which must meet’ as a matter of ‘legal pluralism’ and 
as an expression of the ‘interactions between different ways of knowing and 
doing law.’43 
36 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 28 November 2007, (ser. C) No. 172, para. 82.
37 C. O’ Faircheallaigh, ‘Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal Mining Company 
Agreements in Australia’ (2003) 39 Development and Change 27.
38 E. M. Genia, ‘The Landscape and Language of Indigenous Cultural Rights’ (2012) 44 
Arizona State Law Journal 653, 659. 
39 Cayuga Indians (Great Britain) v. United States, 6 Review of International Arbitral 
Awards 173 (1926) 176 (stating that an Indian tribe ‘is not a legal unit of international 
law.’)
40 S. Wiessner ‘Indigenous Self-Determination, Culture, and Land: A Reassessment in 
Light of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in E. Pulitano 
(ed),  Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 38. 
41 E.-I. Daes ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to their Natural Resources’ in A. Constantinides 
and N. Zaikos (eds), The Diversity of International Law (Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009).  
42 See generally C. Rossi, Sovereignty and the Territorial Temptation (Cambridge: CUP 2017).
43 Rigney, ‘The Hopes and the Discontents of Indigenous–Settler Reconciliation’, 367.
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4. Time
Time plays a crucial role in indigenous peoples’ expressions of sovereignty 
and struggles for self-determination.44 Indigenous peoples have historically 
played a significant role in international relations, signed treaties, and been 
recognised as sovereign nations.45 The issues of ‘[indigenous] rights and 
sovereignty are rooted in the first encounters between the [tribes] and the 
colonial powers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.’46 
In the early modern period, many scholars acknowledged the sovereignty 
and territorial rights of indigenous peoples, including Alberico Gentili 
(1552–1608). A religious refugee and Regius Professor at the University of 
Oxford, Gentili wrote on a variety of matters ranging from state immunity 
to territorial waters, from piracy to preventive war. His reflection on 
cultural diversity and indigenous sovereignty were relatively atypical for his 
time and deserves exploration. For example, Gentili perceived indigenous 
sovereignty ‘as preventing land from being classified as terra nullius, or open 
to acquisition by mere occupation.’47 According to Gentili, if other nations 
‘live in a manner different from that which we follow in our own country, 
they surely do no wrong.’48 As such, no one should be offended by the fact 
that another person practices a different faith. Acknowledging a limited 
cultural and religious pluralism, Gentili believed that religion should not 
give rise to any war, just as cultural diversity should not constitute a just 
cause for waging war. He therefore rejected the legitimacy of any form 
of religious violence, arguing that there should be no forced conversions, 
persecutions, or exterminations. Gentili condemned the Spanish conquest 
of the Americas, in which the Spaniards used religion as a pretext for their 
wars against the natives. For this reason, the Spanish conquest was a clear 
44 M. Rifkin, Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination 
(‘Durham NC’ Duke University Press 2017) 180 (addressing the question as to whether 
sovereignty can be expressed in ways that differ from dominant frames of reference.)
45 See, ex multis, M. Hickford and C. Jones (eds), Indigenous Peoples and the State: 
International Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press 2018).
46 A. F. Kinney, ‘The Tribe, the Empire, and the Nation: Enforceability of Pre-
Revolutionary Treaties with Native American Tribes’ (2007-2008) 39 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 897, 898–99 (referring to the situation of indigenous 
tribes in Virginia).
47 J. Cassidy ‘Sovereignty of Aboriginal Peoples’ (1998) 9 Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 65, 69.
48 A. Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres [1612] (On the Law of War) J. C. Rolfe transl. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1933) Book I, Chapter 9.
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example of an unjust war. Gentili contended that the pursuit of conquest 
(cupiditas gloriae et dominationis) was not a legitimate cause of war.
In rejecting the notion that cultural differences could constitute a 
legitimate cause for waging war, Gentili aligned with the position of the 
Dominican friar and historian Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484–1566) and 
the philosopher Giordano Bruno (1548–1600). In his 1552 Brevísima 
Relación, Las Casas described indigenous kingdoms as ‘illustrious’ (illustria 
regna), ‘with great cities, sovereigns, judges, and laws’ (magnas civitates, 
reges, iudices, leges). 49 He also firmly disavowed the notion that cultural 
difference could be a just cause for war. Las Casas believed that people 
could legitimately defend themselves against those who waged war under 
the pretext of ‘civilizing’ them (praetextu sapientiae).50 While Las Casas 
did not appear among the Gentilian sources, Gentili may have known his 
work, as an English translation of Las Casas’ Brevísima Relación appeared 
in 1583. Both scholars fiercely condemned the Spanish conquest as being 
based on illegitimate grounds. They both acknowledged the sovereignty and 
property rights of the Indians and their right to defend themselves against 
the unlawful expansion of others. Furthermore, both scholars considered all 
human beings to be born free. Like Giordano Bruno, Gentili argued that 
none should be subject to forced conversion to any religion.51
Nonetheless, there was a clear divide between theory and practice. 
Powerful states articulated arguments of discovery and terra nullius and, 
in manifest disregard of the legal theory of the time, granted territorial 
concessions over land they did not own.52 Colonisers in this way became 
proprietors of given land ‘for reasons which had nothing to do with its 
original inhabitants.’53 Wars of conquest motivated by greed and empire 
49 L. Baccelli, ‘Guerra e diritti. Vitoria, Las Casas e la conquista dell’America’, (2008) 37 
Quaderni fiorentini 67–101, 92.
50 Id.
51 D. Suin ‘Sovrani e sudditi: la riflessione di Alberico Gentili tra assolutismo e cosmo-
politismo’, (2017) 9 Storia e Politica 255–278, 267.
52 Alexander VI, bull Inter Caetera 4 May 1493 (‘should any of said islands have been found 
by your envoys and captains, [we] give, grant, and assign to you and your heirs and succes-
sors … forever, together with all their dominions, cities, camps, places, and villages, and all 
rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances, all islands and mainlands found and to be found, 
discovered and to be discovered towards the west and the south …’); Elizabeth I, Charter 
to Sir Humphrey Gilbert of 11 June 1578, reprinted in W. S. Powell, ‘An Elizabethan 
Experiment’, in L. S. Butler, A. D. Watson (eds), The North Carolina Experience: An 
Interpretive and Documentary History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 
1984) 29–52, 36 (granting colonists title to land that the queen did not own).
53 R. Parfitt, ‘The Spectre of Sources’, (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 
297, 301.
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were waged. Invaders imposed their own religion and cultural systems, 
and non-state forms of polities gradually became ‘invisible.’54 Indigenous 
peoples faced decimation due to disease, war, and economic exploitation.55
After ‘years of warfare, disease, and increasingly scarce natural resources’, 
indigenous peoples likely assented to various treaties with colonial powers 
to prevent further violations of their sovereignty and to ‘preserve what 
remained of their heritage and traditional way of life.’56 The aim of most 
treaties between the colonial powers and Aboriginal peoples ‘was to preserve 
Aboriginal self-government rather than cede sovereignty.’ The treaties were 
‘protective in nature, incorporating binding and effective clauses preserving 
Aboriginal rights in perpetuity.’57 Nonetheless, indigenous peoples, soon 
considered part of the new states, ‘would encounter many difficulties in 
enforcing their treaty rights in either the municipal or international courts.’58 
However, indigenous culture, practices, and rule endured.59 Legal 
anthropologists have coined the term ‘inter-legality’ to refer to the blending 
of legal traditions and legal pluralism that has characterised the legal frame 
of colonial states inhabited by indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples 
maintained their traditions, but also adaptively leveraged select legal 
instruments of the super-imposed legal system.60 The concept of inter-
legality captures the existence of various legal frameworks exposed to and 
influenced by mutual exchanges.61 For indigenous peoples, colonialism—
which sought to dispossess them and disregard their sovereignty—has failed 
and indigenous sovereignty has endured.
54 Id. 302; T. Duve, ‘Indigenous Rights in Latin America: A Legal Historical Perspective, 
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, Research Paper No. 2 (2017), 2.
55 Duve, ‘Indigenous Rights in Latin America’, 7.
56 Kinney, ‘The Tribe, the Empire, and the Nation’, 902 (noting that these treaties 
‘remained hardly more than empty words’, proving to be ‘little more than a cessation of 
open hostilities.’) 
57 Cassidy ‘Sovereignty of Aboriginal Peoples’, 96.
58 See e.g. A. Harmon, Reclaiming the Reservation: Histories of Indian Sovereignty 
Suppressed and Renewed (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press 2019) 
(highlighting that ‘Tribal governments ha[ve] long sought to manage affairs in their 
territories’ and considering ‘the promises and perils of relying on the US legal system to 
address the damage caused by colonial dispossession.’)
59 Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty’, 1144.
60 W. Assies, G. van der Haar, and A. J. Hoekema (eds), The Challenge of Diversity, 
Indigenous Peoples, Multicultural Interlegality and Reform of the State in Latin America 
(Amsterdam: Thela 2000).
61 A. Hoekema, ‘Legal Pluralism: Conflicting Legal Commitments Without a Neutral 
Arbiter’ (2014) 11 Jura Gentium–Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della poli-
tica globale 61, 74.
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Due to the failures of early treaties and national law to adequately address 
indigenous peoples’ rights, international law has increasingly regulated 
matters related to indigenous peoples in the past four decades, reaffirming 
their rights and various entitlements. The UNDRIP has recognised that ‘the 
rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements 
between States and indigenous peoples are, in some situations, matters of 
international concern, interest, responsibility, and character.’62 In the Western 
Sahara Advisory Opinion, the ICJ similarly implicitly acknowledged the 
sovereignty of indigenous peoples in the early modern period.63 
5. Indigenous Sovereignty and Law
The sovereignty of indigenous peoples ‘continues to be one of the most 
burning issues in domestic and international law today.’64 For indigenous 
peoples, indigenous sovereignty ‘has never been ceded or extinguished’ and 
co-exists with the sovereignty of the state. This sovereignty is ‘a spiritual 
notion’ representing the ancestral tie between the land, or ‘mother nature’, 
and indigenous peoples.65 Most indigenous peoples do not seek to secede 
from the territories in which they reside; rather, they aim to ‘wield greater 
control over matters such as natural resources, environmental preservation 
of their homelands, education, use of language, and [autonomy] … in order 
to ensure their group’s cultural preservation and integrity.’66 
Several countries have adopted notions of concurrent or parallel 
sovereignty of indigenous peoples within their lands.67 For instance, 
62 UNDRIP, preamble.
63 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 39, para. 80 (stating that 
‘agreements concluded with local rulers . . . were regarded as derivative roots of title.’)
64 Cassidy ‘Sovereignty of Aboriginal Peoples’, 69.
65 J. Brave Noise Cat, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty is on the Rise: Can it Shape the Course 
of History?’ The Guardian, 30 May 2017.
66 J. Corntassel and T. Hopkins Primeau, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty and International 
Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing Self-Determination’ (1995) 17 Human Rights 
Quarterly 343, 344.
67 Cassidy, ‘Sovereignty of Aboriginal Peoples’, 109. Cfr. R. Merino, ‘Reimagining the 
Nation-State: Indigenous Peoples and the Making of Plurinationalism in Latin America’ 
(2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law 773 (highlighting the ‘intrinsic tension 
in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian experience: on the one hand, plurinational governments 
try to unify the people around the ‘national interest’ of developing extractive industries; 
and on the other hand, they attempt to recognize ethno-political differences that often 
challenge the transnational exploitation of local resources.’)
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in the United States, Indigenous peoples have long been recognised as 
sovereign political entities. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Justice John Marshall 
of the US Supreme Court affirmed that at the time of the encounter 
between European and American civilizations, ‘North America … was 
held, occupied and possessed, in full sovereignty, by various independent 
tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their respective 
portions of territory, and the absolute owners and proprietors of the soil.’68 
In Worcester v. Georgia,69 Justice Marshall held that Indian nations have 
always been recognised as ‘distinct, independent, political communities 
and are, as such, qualified to exercise powers of self-government, not by 
virtue of any delegation of powers from the Federal Government, but by 
reason of their original tribal sovereignty.’70 More recently, the Supreme 
Court held that ‘before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were self-
governing sovereign political communities’ and they maintain ‘inherent 
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’71 Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor discussed the existence of ‘three types of sovereign 
entities—the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes’ within 
the US legal system.72 Policy frameworks that build on the principle of self-
determination characterise the current US legal system.
In New Zealand, indigenous sovereignty is part of the existing legal 
framework. The Treaty of Waitangi between the British Crown and the 
Maori testifies to the sovereignty of the Maori people (tino rangatiratanga).73 
The treaty was finally given effectiveness by the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi 
Act by instituting the Waitangi Tribunal to settle land-related disputes. In 
Australia, in Mabo v. Queensland, the indigenous plaintiffs, who inhabited 
68 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 545 (1823).
69 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (building the foundations of the 
doctrine of tribal sovereignty in the United States.) Cfr. Cheroke Nation v. Georgia 30 
US 1, 5 Pet 1 (1831)(the majority held that Indian tribes could not bring suit to the 
Supreme Court against state law requiring their relocation from their lands because they 
were neither foreign nor a state).
70 E.-I. A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 
Lecture delivered at the National Native Title Conference, Adelaide, 3 June 2004, 
available at <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/news/speeches/indigenous-peoples-
permanent-sovereignty-over-natural-resources> (last visited 30 September 2019).
71 United States v. Wheeler, 435 US 313, 322–323 (1978).
72 S. Day O’Connor, ‘Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts (1997) 
33 Tulsa Law Journal 1, 1 (‘Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign 
entities—the Federal Government, the States, and the Indian tribes.’)
73 Daes, Indigenous Peoples Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. See also 
D. Otto, ‘A Question of Law or Politics? Indigenous Claims to Sovereignty in Australia’ 
(1995) 21 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 65, 79–80.
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the Mer Islands situated in the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua 
New Guinea sought declarations, inter alia, that the Meriam people were 
entitled to such islands ‘as owners; as possessors; as occupiers; or as persons 
entitled to use and enjoy the said islands.’ The High Court rejected the 
argument of terra nullius advanced by the defendant and recognised that 
the Mer Islanders had a pre-existing system of law, which remained in force 
under the new sovereign except where specifically modified or extinguished 
by legislative or executive action.74 In Latin America, reforms in Bolivia, 
Venezuela, Panama, and other countries have opened up ‘new spaces for 
indigenous nations’ political representation and the reconfiguration of 
territorial boundaries.’75 For instance, Bolivia defines itself as a ‘plurinational’ 
state that acknowledges ‘the precolonial existence of indigenous nations and 
peoples … [and] guarantees their free determination with the frame of 
the unity of the State, … [and] their culture … in accordance with [the] 
Constitution and the law.’76 The Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal 
of Bolivia has further clarified that the state ‘not only acknowledges the 
indigenous peoples as different cultures … but also as nations’, that is, 
‘as historical communities with a determined home territory that shar[e] 
differentiated language and culture’ [and have the] political capability 
to define their destiny … within the … State.’77 Although states have 
recognised ‘a limited degree of indigenous sovereignty, they consider such 
sovereignty as subordinated’ to state sovereignty, and indigenous rights, 
‘although recognised in principle’, remain precarious in practice.78 
International law instruments do not refer to the notion of indigenous 
sovereignty. On the contrary, by endorsing the notion of state sovereignty 
as one of its basic pillars, it validated the colonization process through ‘the 
recognition of the sovereignty claims of colonial powers and non-recognition 
of the sovereignty of indigenous populations.’79 The concept of terra nullius, 
rejected by early modern scholars such as Gentili, was subsequently endorsed 
74 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23, (1992) 175 CLR 1.
75 A. Gaitán-Barrera and G. Khalid Azeez, ‘Regaining Pre-colonial Sovereignty: The 
Case of Miskitu Resistance’ (2015) 21 Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 
360–373, 360.
76 SAS v Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Objections to Jurisdiction, Admissibility and 
Counter-Memorial on the Merits, 31 March 2015 (unofficial English translation) para. 35.
77 Id. para. 36.
78 F. Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2006–7) 42 Texas International Law Journal 175.
79 S. Wheatley, ‘Conceptualizing the Authority of the Sovereign State over Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 371–96, 378. 
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by members of the international community to justify conquest.80 While 
‘the various European powers made different claims as to the basis of the 
acquisition of territory … there was one thing in which they all agreed, that 
of almost entirely disregarding the right of the native inhabitants of these 
regions.’81 In fact the concept of terra nullius ‘not only disregard[ed] the 
will of the conquered original inhabitants of the land, but treat[ed] them, 
in essence, as legally irrelevant.’82 For instance, the International Court of 
Justice held that an 1884 treaty concluded between the Kings and Chiefs 
of Old Calabar on the one hand and Great Britain on the other was not 
‘governed by international law’ because it was not a treaty between states.83 
It thus rejected the argument advanced by Nigeria that ‘in the pre-colonial 
era the City States of the Calabar region constituted “independent entities 
with international legal personality”.’84 Quoting Huber’s Award in the Island 
of Palmas case, the Court considered the treaty ‘not an agreement between 
equals; it is rather a form of internal organisation of a colonial territory, on 
the basis of autonomy of the natives . . . And thus suzerainty over the native 
States becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty as towards other members 
of the community of nations.’85 Today, international law has discarded 
the concept of terra nullius since the 1975 Western Sahara Opinion of the 
ICJ, which did not recognise original title obtained by occupation of terra 
nullius, rather holding that agreements between indigenous peoples and 
states were ‘derivative roots of title.’86 
Nowadays, the symbiosis between state and sovereignty may gradually 
give way to a more nuanced, comprehensive, and multicultural conception 
of sovereignty. International law scholars have conceptualised the notion of 
indigenous sovereignty as a type of ‘parallel sovereignty’ that can co-exist 
with state sovereignty.87 Critics have expressed concern about whether 
two ‘sovereigns’ can exist within one State. However, international law 
scholars have used the term indigenous sovereignty without diminishing 
or contradicting state sovereignty. For Lenzerini, indigenous sovereignty 
80 Id. 380.
81 Id. (citing Wheaton).
82 Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty’, 1153.
83 Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria)(Jurisdiction) (2002) ICJ Reports 303, para. 205.
84 Id. para. 201.
85 Id. para. 205 (quoting Max Huber, Island of Palmas case, United States v Netherlands, 
Permanent Court of Arbitration Award, 4 April 1928, (1928) II Review of International 
Arbitral Awards 829, 858–859).
86 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 ICJ Reports 12, 39.
87 Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited’, 155.
106
V. Vadi
constitutes a form of shared sovereignty or diarchy, and an emerging norm 
of customary law.88 It ‘shift[s] some aspects of state sovereignty, providing 
indigenous peoples with some significant sovereign prerogatives that 
previously belonged to the state.’89 Daes links the rights of indigenous 
peoples, including their self-determination, to the notion of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. As is known, the notion of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources belongs to peoples and has become a 
general principle of international law since its inclusion in common Article 
1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Such provision provides that ‘All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.’ 90 It also provides that ‘All peoples may, for their own 
ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice 
to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based 
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may 
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.’91 In a case involving 
the Ogoni people of Nigeria, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights held that the term ‘all peoples’ includes Indigenous peoples 
in interpreting Article 21 of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights which affirms a right of ‘[a]ll peoples’ to ‘freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources.’
The emergence of a notion of indigenous sovereignty, meant as an 
expression of internal self-determination within the state, is fully compatible 
with existing international law. In recent decades, international law has 
increasingly regulated matters related to indigenous peoples, reaffirming 
their rights and various entitlements.92 The sovereign powers of states are 
‘effectively limited by parallel powers that are consolidating in favour of 
culturally distinct communities.’93 The emergence of the human rights 
paradigm in the aftermath of WWII and the decolonisation process have 
offered momentum to the renaissance of indigenous rights at the international 
88 Id. 187.
89 Id. 189.
90 ICCPR Article 1.1; ICESCR, Article 1.1.
91 ICCPR Article 1.2; ICESCR, Article 1.2. See also ICCPR Article 47 and ICESCR Article 
25 (‘Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of 
all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.’)
92 M. Barelli, Seeking Justice in International Law: the Significance and Implications of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (London: Routledge 2016).
93 Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited’, 183.
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level by fostering the adoption of international law instruments which 
recognise indigenous peoples’ rights. At the international level, these rights 
have been protected and promoted in two complementary ways: on the one 
hand, the protection and promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights remain 
embedded in the human rights framework. On the other hand, indigenous 
peoples have supported the creation of special forums and bodies that 
exclusively deal with their unique situation as well as the elaboration of legal 
instruments that focus on their rights.94 For example, the creation of the 
United Nations Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) reflects 
the efforts of indigenous peoples ‘to create space for themselves and their 
issues’ within the United Nations machinery.95 Furthermore, both the 1989 
International Labour Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention No. 169)96 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP)97 are special instruments for the protection of indigenous 
peoples. All these instruments aim at re-empowering indigenous peoples, 
limiting the power of the state over indigenous peoples and acknowledging 
the simultaneous coexistence of multiple legal orders.
In particular, the UNDRIP, which is deemed to reflect customary 
international law, inter alia recognises the rights of indigenous peoples to 
control, use, and own their land.98 It also recognises the rights of indigenous 
peoples to participate in political debates and to veto laws and policies that 
might affect their ways of life.99 More fundamentally, UNDRIP recognises 
indigenous peoples’ right of autonomy and self-government and considers 
their laws, traditions, and customs as a legal system.100 Finally, ‘the principal 
objective and purpose of UNDRIP’ is ‘to establish the necessary conditions 
to give effect to the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples 
94 K. Göcke ‘Protection and Realization of Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights at the 
National and International Level’ (2013) 5 Goettingen Journal of International Law 124.
95 S. Sargent ‘Transnational Networks and United Nations Human Rights Structural 
Change: The Future of Indigenous and Minority Rights’ (2012) 16 International Journal 
of Human Rights 123–151, 136 (also noting, at 139, that the membership composition 
of the UNPFII – of state and indigenous representatives on equal footing – ‘is a unique 
achievement in international indigenous rights, and indeed, in international law.’)
96 International Labour Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries (ILO Convention No. 169), 27 June 1989, 28 ILM 1382.
97 See generally UNDRIP.
98 UNDRIP, Articles 25–30 and 32.
99 UNDRIP, Articles 15, 18, and 19.
100 UNDRIP Article 34.
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within the territorial boundaries of the state.’101 Self-determination is a key 
element of indigenous sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirm the fundamental 
importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of 
which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.102 As noted by Daes, ‘There 
is a growing and positive trend in international law and practice to extend 
the concept and principle of self-determination to peoples and groups 
within existing States.’ In this sense, self-determination does not necessarily 
entail a right to secession or independence (except for certain exceptional 
conditions); rather, it includes the right to various forms of autonomy and 
self-governance. As Daes explains, ‘[i]n order to be meaningful, this modern 
concept of self-determination must logically and legally carry with it the 
essential right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.’103 
The UNDRIP explicitly recognizes that indigenous peoples have the 
right to self-determination. Article 46 of the UNDRIP nonetheless provides 
that ‘nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any 
state, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to 
perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed 
as authorising or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign 
and independent states.’ As noted by Barelli, this provision ‘seems to be 
generally in line with the aspirations of the vast majority of indigenous 
peoples, whose self-determination claims are not aimed at dissolving 
states.’104 The possibility of external self-determination or remedial secession 
might be exercised only if a state committed systematic and severe forms 
of oppression and subjugation.105 While the existence and extent of a right 
to of remedial secession remains contested, the UNDRIP is not meant to 
restrict the rights of indigenous peoples, and therefore it can reflect further 
developments in international law. 
101 Wheatley, ‘Conceptualizing the Authority of the Sovereign State over Indigenous 
Peoples’, 375 (referring to UNDRIP Article 46). 
102 UNDRIP, preamble.
103 E.-I. A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 
Lecture delivered at the National Native Title Conference, Adelaide, 3 June 2004, avail-
able at <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/news/speeches/indigenous-peoples-per-
manent-sovereignty-over-natural-resources> (last visited 30 September 2019).
104 M. Barelli, Seeking Justice in International Law (London: Routledge 2016) 25.
105 J. Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-determination in International Law: Its Development 
and Future’, in P. Alston (ed),  Peoples’ Rights (Oxford: OUP 2000) 7–68, 56 and 57.
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There has been a clear paradigm shift in international law, whereby 
the international law protection of indigenous rights now constitutes 
a significant promise for indigenous peoples worldwide. This shift 
re-empowers indigenous peoples106 and moves the discourse on their rights 
from the local to the international level with an intensity that was previously 
missing. From objects of protection, indigenous peoples have now become 
subjects of rights under international law.107 The new legal framework is 
fully compatible with the emergence of a notion of indigenous sovereignty 
as a parallel sovereignty of indigenous polities that co-exists with state 
sovereignty. This notion overcomes the traditional Western (Westphalian) 
notion of sovereignty as an emanation of statehood. This notion has not 
emerged in order to encourage a secession of indigenous lands from states; 
rather, it aims at effectively limiting the power of the state over indigenous 
communities and empowering indigenous peoples.108  
The notion of indigenous sovereignty encapsulates diverse albeit related 
rights and the international law regime on the rights of indigenous peoples 
as a whole. However, it is more than the sum of its parts. It reinforces the 
idea that indigenous peoples should have the freedom ‘to choose what their 
future will be.’109 It effectively acknowledges the linkage between indigenous 
people and their land, thus enhancing the fulfilment of their rights to land 
and self-determined development.110 It does not alter the existing legal 
framework; rather, it can fulfil the promise of existing international law. 
As Otto wrote, ‘within the modern discourse of a new world order are the 
seeds of resistance and change.’111 For instance, by evoking the notion of 
supreme power, the notion of sovereignty can help states in protecting, 
fulfilling, and promoting the effective implementation of the rights of 
106 For a seminal study, see R. L. Barsch, ‘Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object 
to Subject of International Law’ (1994) 7 Harvard Human Rights Journal 33. See also J. 
Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 
(Ardsley: Transnational Publishers 2006).
107 F. Gómez Isa, ‘Indigenous Peoples: from Objects of Protection to Subjects of Rights’ 
in A. Brysk and M. Stohl (eds), Expanding Human Rights 21st Century Norms and 
Governance (Cheltenham: EE  2017) 55–74.
108 Nicol, ‘From Territory to Rights.’ 
109 R. Porter, ‘The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty (2002) 34 Arizona State 
Law Journal 75, 75.
110 J. Gilbert and C. Lennox, ‘Towards New Development Paradigms: The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a Tool to Support Self-
Determined Development’ (2019) 23 International Journal of Human Rights, 104-124.
111 D. Otto, ‘Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community 
and the Incommensurability of Difference’ (1996) 5 Society & Legal Studies 337.
110
V. Vadi
indigenous peoples. Rather than considering free, prior, and informed 
consent (FPIC) as requiring mere consultations with indigenous peoples, 
FPIC should be interpreted literally as ‘consent’, meaning that they should 
have the last word on how to govern their land and resources. If the concept 
of indigenous sovereignty is not linked to secession, it is deeply linked to 
self-determination and can help to shape state policies in conformity with 
existing international law. 
Proponents of indigenous sovereignty do not use it as a tool to 
undermine indigenous peoples’ rights, and diminish the obligations 
that states have towards indigenous peoples. On the contrary, discussing 
indigenous sovereignty is a way to create momentum, and to invite states 
to reflect on how best to implement their obligations towards indigenous 
peoples under international law. Indigenous sovereignty is not meant to 
indicate a state of semi-sovereignty or a state of vassalage.  
Rather, through adopting an inter-civilizational lens, it is possible 
to conceptualise a notion of indigenous sovereignty which expresses 
self-determination and draws on concepts used by indigenous peoples 
themselves, and is supreme and parallel to that of the state. Self-
determination, full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in 
decisions that can affect them and their rights in accordance with their right 
to give or withhold free, prior, and informed consent, together with equity 
of remedies, are key principles to realise indigenous sovereignty.112 In this 
regard, scholars have argued that indigenous notions of sovereignty should 
be recognised in addition to classical Western notions of state sovereignty.113 
Indigenous notions of sovereignty aim at safeguarding the ways of life 
of indigenous peoples through their own decision-making processes and 
distinct legal frameworks.114 While political and legal theorists have long 
112 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, International investment agreements, including bilateral investment 
treaties and investment chapters of free trade agreements, A/HRC/33/42 (2016) para. 17 
(‘States are obliged to establish culturally appropriate mechanisms to enable the effective 
participation of indigenous peoples in all decision-making processes that directly affect 
their rights. To ensure this, international human rights law standards require good-faith 
consultations to obtain their free, prior and informed consent. This requirement applies 
prior to the enactment of legislative or administrative measures, the development of 
investment plans or the issuance of concessions, licences or permits for projects in or 
near their territories.’)
113 S. Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1141.
114 L. Graham and S. Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty, Culture and International 
Human Rights Law’ (2011) 110 South Atlantic Quarterly 403, 410.
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taken for granted that law is the province of states only, tribal law has 
always existed. There exists a ‘plurality of legal dimensions.’115 Discussing 
indigenous sovereignty is a way to acknowledge the plurality of civilizations. 
6. Conclusion
Sovereignty is a concept in flux. Several scholars have discussed the 
concept of indigenous sovereignty, meant as parallel sovereignty, in addition 
to state sovereignty. While some argue that such sovereignty may be an 
expression of an emerging norm of customary law, others link the notion to 
the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the right to 
self-determination. Irrespective of the legal status of the concept, this chapter 
argues that indigenous sovereignty is a useful heuristic tool to guide states in 
implementing their international obligations towards indigenous peoples.
The time has come to acknowledge indigenous sovereignty as an 
expression of ‘the simultaneous authority of many co-existing legal orders.’116 
Indigenous sovereignty does not replace state sovereignty but exists in 
parallel. The concept of indigenous sovereignty is not only compatible 
with international law, but it has also been a historical (albeit for a long 
time invisible) feature of international law for centuries. While the course 
of international law could have taken different turns, this chapter suggests 
that international law contains the seeds of resistance, and of transformative, 
albeit unrealised, potential. The question of indigenous sovereignty has 
its roots in history and holds fundamental importance for the present 
and future of millions of people worldwide. The notion of indigenous 
sovereignty does not have clear borders in space or time; rather, it can give 
‘an open future back to the past.’117 It is based on the recognition that 
cultural diversity is an essential component of the international community. 
It acknowledges that the struggles of indigenous peoples have not yet ended, 
and aims to contribute to broader debates about international justice.
Even if we admitted that international law is a fragmented and/
or broken system, ‘the alternative is despair’, violence, and inequality.118 
115 M. Bussani, ‘Strangers in the Law: Lawyers’ Law and the Other Legal Dimensions’ 
(2019) 40 Cardozo Law Review 3125, 3126.
116 R. Parfitt, ‘The Spectre of Sources’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 303.
117 I. Ventzke, ‘Possibilities of the Past: Histories of the NIEO and the Travails of 
Critique’ (2018) 20 Journal of the History of International Law 263–302.
118 N. Berman, ‘But the Alternative Is Despair: European Nationalism and the Modernist 
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Only by looking beyond the cracks of the system and by reflecting on 
how to deal with such ruptures can international lawyers contribute to 
the development of the system. Some hope remains that international law 
can bring some justice, equality, and peace, to the world. Human dignity, 
equality, self-determination, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
and the prohibition of slavery and genocide are all paramount values that 
are inscribed in the grammar of international law. International lawyers can 
learn from the mistakes of the past in order to create a more just international 
system. By connecting the fragments in which humanity, civilizations, 
and interests are divided, international lawyers can build bridges among 
civilizations, foster dialogue among them, and promote peace and justice.119 
Renewal of International Law’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1792–1903.
119 Y. Onuma, International Law in a Transcivilizational World (Cambridge: CUP 2017).
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